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Summary 
 
 In Rasul v. Bush,124 S.Ct. 2686 (2004), a divided Supreme Court declared that “a 
state of war is not a blank check for the president”and ruled that persons deemed “enemy 
combatants” have the right to challenge their detention before a judge or other “neutral 
decision-maker.” The decision reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, which had agreed with the Bush Administration that no U.S. court has 
jurisdiction to hear petitions for habeas corpus by or on behalf of the detainees because 
they are aliens and are detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States. 
Lawyers have filed more than a dozen petitions on behalf of some 60 detainees in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia, where judges have reached opposing 
conclusions as to whether the detainees have any enforceable rights to challenge their 
treatment and detention. Fifteen of the detainees have been determined by the President 
to be subject to his military order (“MO”) of November 13, 2001,1 making them eligible 
for trial by military commission.2 Military commissions were temporarily halted pending 
the result of one case, but are to be resumed now that the D.C. Circuit has reversed the 
decision of a lower court that had found the procedures for military commissions to be 
invalid. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Order on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 
November 13, 2001, 66 Fed.Reg. 57,833 (2000)(hereinafter “MO” or “military order”). 
 
2 For an analysis of the military commission rules, see CRS Report RL31600, The Department of 
Defense Rules for Military Commissions: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with 
Proposed Legislation and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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     After the U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to hear legal 
challenges on behalf of more than 500 persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in connection with the war against terrorism, the Pentagon 
established administrative hearings, called “Combatant Status Review Tribunals” 
(CSRTs), to allow the detainees to contest their status as enemy combatants. This 
report provides an overview of the CSRT procedures and summarizes court cases 
related to the detentions and the use of military commissions. The relevant Supreme 
Court rulings are discussed in CRS Report RS21884, The Supreme Court and 
Detainees in the War on Terrorism: Summary and Analysis. This report will be 
updated as events warrant. 
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The White House determined in February 2002 that Taliban detainees are covered under 
the Geneva Conventions,3 while Al Qaeda detainees are not,4 but that none of the 
detainees qualifies for the status of prisoner of war (POW) under the Conventions. The 
Bush Administration has deemed all of the detainees to be “unlawful enemy combatants,” 
who may, according to Administration officials, be held indefinitely without trial or even 
were they eventually acquitted by a military tribunal. However, the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay have been allowed to meet with representatives of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and diplomatic representatives of their States of 
nationality. An unknown number of detainees is reported to be held in Afghanistan and 
other locations abroad. It is unclear whether these detainees will have a right to challenge 
their detention under the Court’s decision in Rasul. 
 
     Combatant Status Review Tribunals. In response to Supreme Court decisions in 
2004 related to ‘enemy combatants,’5 the Pentagon established procedures for Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals, based on the procedures the Army uses to determine POW 
status during traditional wars.6 According to the Department of Defense (DoD), “any 
detainee who is determined not to be an enemy combatant will be transferred to their 
country of citizenship or other disposition consistent with domestic and international 
obligations and U.S. foreign policy.”7 CSRTs have been completed for all detainees, and 
have confirmed the status of 520 enemy combatants. Of the 38 detainees determined not 
to be enemy combatants, 23 have been transferred to their home States. Presumably, any 
new detainees that might be transported to Guantanamo Bay will go before a CSRT. 
 
     The tribunals are administrative rather than adversarial, but each detainee has an 
opportunity to present “reasonably available” evidence and witnesses to a panel of three 
commissioned officers to try to demonstrate that the detainee does not meet the criteria to 
be designated as an “enemy combatant,” defined as “an individual who was part of or 
supporting Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners[,] ...[including] any person who has 
committed  a belligerent  act or has  directly supported  hostilities in  aid of enemy  armed  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3 The two most relevant are the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317 (hereinafter “GPW”); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (hereinafter “GC”). 
 
4 White House Memorandum, “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees” (Feb. 7, 
2002), available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf]. 
 
5 For an analysis of relevant decisions, see The Supreme Court and Detainees in the War on 
Terrorism: Summary and Analysis, CRS Report RS21884. 
 
6 See Department of Defense (DoD) Fact Sheet, “Combatant Status Review Tribunals,” available 
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707factsheet.pdf]. CSRT proceedings are 
modeled on the procedures of Army Regulation (AR) 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained 
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees (1997), which establishes administrative 
procedures to determine the status of detainees under the Geneva Conventions and prescribes 
their treatment in accordance with international law. For more information, see Treatment of 
“Battlefield Detainees” in the War on Terrorism, CRS Report RL31367. 
 
7 See DoD Press Release, “Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Issued” (June 7, 2004), 





forces.” Each detainee is represented by a military officer (not a member of the Judge 
Advocate General Corps) and may elect to participate in the hearing or remain silent. 
 
     The CSRTs are not bound by the rules of evidence that would apply in court, and the 
government’s evidence is presumed to be “genuine and accurate.” The government is 
required to present all of its relevant evidence, including evidence that tends to negate the 
detainee’s designation, to the tribunal. Unclassified summaries of relevant evidence may 
be provided to the detainee. The detainee’s personal representative may view classified 
information and comment on it to the tribunal to aid in its determination but does not act 
as an advocate for the detainee. If the tribunal determines that the preponderance of the 
evidence is insufficient to support a continued designation as “enemy combatant” and its 
recommendation is approved through the chain of command established for that purpose, 
the detainee will be informed of that decision upon finalization of transportation 
arrangements (or earlier, if the task force commander deems it appropriate). The rules do 
not give a timetable for informing detainees in the event that the tribunal has decided to 
retain their enemy combatant designations. 
 
     In March 2002, the Pentagon announced plans to create a separate process for 
periodically reviewing the status of detainees.8 The process, similar to the CSRT process, 
affords persons detained at Guantánamo Bay the opportunity to present to a review board, 
on at least an annual basis while hostilities are ongoing, information to show that the 
detainee is no longer a threat or that it is in the interest of the United States and its allies 
to release the prisoner. The detainee’s State of nationality may be allowed, national 
security concerns permitting, to submit information on behalf of its national. 
 
Court Challenges to the Detention Policy 
 
     While it is now clear that the detainees have recourse to federal courts to challenge 
their detention, the extent to which they may enforce any rights they may have under the 
Geneva Conventions and other law remains unclear. The Justice Department argues that 
Rasul v. Bush merely decided the issue of jurisdiction, but that the 1950 Supreme Court 
decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager9 remains applicable to limit the relief to which the 
detainees are entitled. While one district judge from the D.C. Circuit agreed,10 others have 
not, holding that detainees have the right to the assistance of an attorney.11 One judge 
found that a detainee has the right to be treated as a POW until a “competent tribunal” 
decides otherwise,12 but the appellate court reversed. The following sections summarize 
the three most important decisions as they make their way through the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals and, it is expected, to the Supreme Court. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8 See DoD Press Release, “DoD Announces Draft Detainee Review Policy” (March 3, 2004), 
available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040303-0403.html]. 
 
9 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear a petition 
on behalf of German citizens who had been convicted by U.S. military commissions in China 
because the writ of habeas corpus was not available to “enemy alien[s], who at no relevant time 
and in no stage of [their] captivity [have] been within [the court’s] jurisdiction”). 
 
10 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D. D.C. 2005). 
 
11 Al Odah v. United States, No. CIV.A. 02-828(CKK) (D. D.C. Oct. 20, 2004). 
 
12 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp.2d 152 (D. D.C. 2004), rev’d ___ F.3d ___ (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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     Khalid v. Bush.13 Seven detainees, all of whom had been captured outside of 
Afghanistan, sought relief from their detention at the Guantanamo Bay facility. U.S. 
District Judge Richard J. Leon agreed with the Administration that Congress, in its 
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF),14 granted President Bush the authority to 
detain foreign enemy combatants outside the United States for the duration of the war 
against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and that the courts have virtually no power to review 
the conditions under which such prisoners are held. Noting that the prisoners had been 
captured and detained pursuant to the President’s military order,15 Judge Leon agreed with 
the government that “(1) non-resident aliens detained under [such] circumstances have no 
rights under the Constitution; (2) no existing federal law renders their custody unlawful; 
(3) no legally binding treaty is applicable; and (4) international law is not binding under 
these circumstances.” 
 
     Judge Leon rejected the petitioners’ contention that their arrest outside of Afghanistan 
and away from any active battlefield meant that they could not be “enemy combatants” 
within the meaning of the law of war, finding instead that the AUMF contains no 
geographical boundaries,16 and authorizes the President to exercise his war power 
wherever enemy combatants are found. The circumstances behind the off-battlefield 
captures did, however, apparently preclude the petitioners from claiming their detentions 
violate the Geneva Conventions.17 Other treaties put forth by the petitioners were found to 
be unavailing because of their non-self-executing nature.18 The court declined to evaluate 
whether the conditions of detention were unlawful. Judge Leon concluded that “[w]hile a 
state of war does not give the President a ‘blank check,’ and the courts must have some 
role when individual liberty is at stake, any role must be limited when, as here, there is an 
ongoing armed conflict and the individuals challenging their detention are non-resident 
aliens.”19 He dismissed all seven petitions, ruling that “until Congress and the President 
act further, there is . . . no viable legal theory under international law by which a federal 
court could issue a writ.” 
 
     In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases.20 U.S. District Judge Joyce Hens Green 
interpreted Rasul more broadly, finding that the detainees do have rights under the U.S. 
Constitution and international treaties, and thus denied the government’s motion to 
dismiss the eleven challenges before the court. Specifically, Judge Green held that the 
detainees are entitled to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment, and that the 
CSRT  procedures do not meet  that standard.   Interpreting the  history of Supreme Court  
________________________________________________________________________ 
13 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D. D.C. 2005). 
 
14 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“the AUMF”), P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 
15 Although the MO states that it authorizes detention as well as trial by military commissions, 
only fifteen of the detainees have been formally designated as subject to the MO. 
 
16 Khalid at 320. 
 
17 Id. at 326. 
 
18 Id. at 327. It may be argued that the habeas statute itself (28 U.S.C. § 2241), which authorizes 
petitions alleging detention in violation of any treaty of the United States, provides a means for 
private enforcement. 
 
19 Id. at 330 (citations omitted). 
 
20 355 F.Supp.2d 443 (D. D.C. 2005). 
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rulings on the availability of constitutional rights in territories under the control of the 
American government (though not part of its sovereign territory), Judge Green concluded 
that the inquiry turns on the fundamental nature of the constitutional rights being asserted 
rather than the citizenship of the person asserting them. Accepting that the right not to be 
deprived of liberty without due process of law is a fundamental constitutional right, the 
judge applied a balancing test to determine what process is due in light of the 
government’s significant interest in safeguarding national security.21 Judge Green rejected 
the government’s stance that the CSRTs provided more than sufficient due process for 
the detainees. Instead, she identified two categories of defects. She objected to the 
CSRTs’ failure to provide the detainees with access to material evidence upon which the 
tribunal affirmed their “enemy combatant” status and the failure to permit the assistance 
of counsel to compensate for the lack of access. These circumstances, she said, deprived  
detainees of a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against them. 
 
     Second, in particular cases, the judge found that the CSRTs’ handling of accusations  
of torture and the vague and potentially overbroad definition of “enemy combatant” could 
violate the due process rights of detainees. Citing detainees’ statements and news reports 
of abuse, Judge Green noted that the possibility that evidence was obtained involuntarily 
from the accused or from other witnesses, whether by interrogators at Guantanamo or by 
foreign intelligence officials elsewhere, could make such evidence unreliable and thus 
constitutionally inadmissible as a basis on which to determine whether a detainee is an 
enemy combatant. Judge Green objected to the definition of “enemy combatant” because 
it appears to cover “individuals who never committed a belligerent act or who never 
directly supported hostilities against the U.S. or its allies.” She noted that government 
counsel had, in response to a set of hypothetical questions, stated that the following could 
be treated as enemy combatants under the AUMF: “[a] little old lady in Switzerland who 
writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] 
really is a front to finance al-Qaeda activities, a person who teaches English to the son of 
an al Qaeda member, and a journalist who knows the location of Osama Bin Laden but 
refuses to disclose it to protect her source.”22 Judge Green stated that the indefinite 
detention of a person solely because of his contacts with individuals or organizations tied 
to terrorism, and not due to any direct involvement in terrorist activities, would violate 
due process even if such detention were found to be authorized by the AUMF.23 
 
     The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is considering the government’s appeal with 
respect to the holding that the detainees have enforceable rights under the Constitution 
and international law, as well as appeals by some detainees with respect to other aspects 
of Judge Green’s decision. Briefs are due June 28, 2005, with oral arguments to be 
scheduled at a later date. The detainees’ appeal of the Khalid decision, supra, is to be 
heard on the same day. 
 
       Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.24  Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who was captured in 
Afghanistan  and is  alleged to  have worked  for Osama  Bin Laden  as a body guard  and  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21 Id. at 465 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld). 
 
22 Id. at 475 (internal citations omitted). 
 
23 Id. at 476. 
 




driver, brought this challenge to the lawfulness of the Secretary of Defense’s plan to try 
him for alleged war crimes before a military commission convened pursuant to the 
President’s military order. Hamdan’s attorney objected to the military commission rules 
and procedures, which he argued were inconsistent with the UCMJ and Hamdan’s right 
to be treated as a prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions. U.S. District Judge 
Robertson agreed, finding that the Geneva Conventions apply to the whole of the conflict 
in Afghanistan, including under their protections all persons detained in connection with 
the hostilities there.25 Accordingly, he ruled, Hamdan was entitled to be treated as a 
prisoner of war until his status was determined to be otherwise by a competent tribunal, 
in accordance with article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war). The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Randolph, reversed that finding, 
ruling that the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable,26 and that in any event, 
the military commission would qualify as a “competent tribunal” within the meaning of 
U.S. Army regulations implementing the Conventions.27 Judge Williams wrote a 
concurring opinion, agreeing with the government’s conception of the conflict with Al 
Qaida as separate from the conflict with the Taliban, but construing Common Article 3 to 
apply to any conflict with a non-state actor, without regard to the geographical 
confinement of such a conflict within the borders of a signatory state. 
 
     With respect to the President’s military order establishing military commissions, the 
district court judge had found no inherent authority in the President as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Armed Forces to create such tribunals, and that existing statutory authority 
for military commissions is limited. Interpreting the statute in light of the Geneva 
Conventions, which permits the punishment of prisoners of war “only if the sentence has 
been pronounced by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of 
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power,”28 Judge Robertson found no 
congressional authority for Hamdan’s trial under the DoD’s rules for military 
commissions. He found these rules to be fatally inconsistent with the UCMJ (contrary to 
UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836) because they give military authorities the power to 
exclude the accused from hearings and deny him access to evidence presented against 
him.29 The Circuit Court reversed, opining that Congress did not mean that all of the 
UCMJ procedural rules for courts-martial should apply to military commissions. Instead, 
the panel interpreted art. 36 to mean that military commission rules have only to be 
consistent with those articles of the UCMJ that refer specifically to military commissions. 
However, because the procedural rules to be used by the military commissions do not 
affect their jurisdiction, it was unnecessary to resolve the issue at the interlocutory stage 
of the case. The court left open the possibility that Hamdan can challenge the procedural 
rules if he is convicted by the military commission, possibly by bringing a new habeas 





25 Id. at 161 (rejecting the government’s position that the military is engaged in two separate 
conflicts in Afghanistan, respectively, against the Taliban and against Al Qaeda). 
 
26 Rumsfeld v. Hamdan, No. 04-5393, slip op. at 10 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2005). 
 
27 Id. at 19. 
 
28 GPW art. 102. 
 
29 344 F.Supp.2d at 166. 
 
